MAWAA Project Summary Report 3: Deployment Experience by Chown, Tim
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in 
Academia (MAWAA) Project 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
Towards Seamless Wireless Mobility for UK Academic Networks 
 
 
 
 
 
Project Summary Report 3: 
Deployment Experience 
 
 
 
 
Editor:  Dr T J Chown 
 
 
School of Electronics and Computer Science, 
University of Southampton, 
Southampton, SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom 
tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk 
 
Version 1.0  
 
 
 
30 June 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
The MAWAA project was funded by the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) 
 Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
1 of 46  1
 
 
Contents 
 
1  INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................3 
1.1  MAWAA PROJECT REPORTS...............................................................................3 
1.2  DEPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE.................................................................................3 
2  CHOICE OF DEPLOYMENT TECHNOLOGY.....................................................4 
2.1  ORIGINAL SYSTEM .............................................................................................4 
2.2  WLAN TECHNOLOGY DISCUSSION......................................................................4 
2.2.1  Simplicity...................................................................................................4 
2.2.2  Cost...........................................................................................................5 
2.2.3  Roaming support........................................................................................6 
2.2.4  IPv6 support...............................................................................................6 
2.2.5  Other considerations...................................................................................6 
2.3  FLEXIBILITY IN DEPLOYMENT.............................................................................7 
2.4  SUMMARY.........................................................................................................7 
3  DEPLOYING 802.1X..............................................................................................8 
3.1  TWO CLASSES OF USERS.....................................................................................8 
3.1.1  Sponsored Guest Access............................................................................10 
3.1.2  Using multiple SSIDs................................................................................10 
3.1.3  Using multiple VLANs...............................................................................10 
3.1.4  Password considerations...........................................................................10 
3.2  802.1X SUPPORT.............................................................................................. 11 
3.2.1  Operating system support..........................................................................11 
3.2.2  Access Point support.................................................................................12 
3.2.3  RADIUS server support.............................................................................13 
3.3  INFRASTRUCTURE INSTALLATION...................................................................... 13 
3.4  CLIENT INSTALLATION..................................................................................... 13 
3.4.1  Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP1......................................................................14 
3.4.2  Linux.......................................................................................................16 
3.4.3  Mac OS/X................................................................................................16 
3.5  USAGE MONITORING........................................................................................ 17 
4  RADIUS HIERARCHY DEPLOYMENT.............................................................18 
4.1  LOCAL RADIUS AND CREDENTIALS................................................................. 19 
4.2  HIERARCHY..................................................................................................... 19 
5  IPV6 IMPLICATIONS..........................................................................................20 
6  UNIVERSITY OUTREACH: COMMUNITY WIRELESS...................................21 
6.1  OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................... 22 
6.2  TECHNICAL SETUP........................................................................................... 22 
6.3  DEPLOYMENT EXPERIENCES............................................................................. 22 
6.4  LINK WITH ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE........................................... 23 
6.5  AUTHENTICATION SERVICE .............................................................................. 23 
7  CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK...........................................................24 
7.1  FUTURE AUTHENTICATION WORK...................................................................... 25 
7.2  OTHER RELATED FUTURE WORK........................................................................ 25 
7.3  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................................... 26 Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
2 of 46  2
8  REFERENCES......................................................................................................27 
9  APPENDIX A: RADIUS CONFIGURATION FOR 802.1X..................................33 
10  APPENDIX B: RADIUS CONFIGURATION FOR MAC AUTH .....................37 
11  APPENDIX C: OFFSITE PROXY RADIUS SERVERS...................................39 
12  APPENDIX D: LIST OF SITE ACCESS POINTS............................................40 
13  APPENDIX E: CISCO 1200 SERIES AP CONFIGURATION..........................41 
14  APPENDIX F: RADIUS ACCOUNTING FOR MAC-BASED USER...............44 
15  APPENDIX G: RADIUS ACCOUNTING FOR 802.1X-BASED USER.............45 
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Server certificate screen on Windows XP configuration..............................15 
Figure 2: Selecting EAP type in the Mac OS/X 802.1x configuration.........................17 
Figure 3: MRTG plots of simultaneous WLAN user statistics.....................................18 
 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1: Operating system client 802.1x support........................................................11 Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
3 of 46  3
 
1  Introduction 
 
The subject matter of wireless networking is one of huge interest for academic (and 
other) institutions at the time of writing.    The 2003 UKERNA Networkshop session 
on wireless LAN (WLAN) was the most popular session of the event, and that interst 
was repeated in 2004.   A subsequent technical workshop [WAGCONF] filled with 
over 150 registered attendees in quick time.   A recent UCISA “Top Concerns” 
exercise shows mobile (wireless) access and authentication issues in the top three 
positions [UCISA-TOP]. 
 
In this light, the support from JISC for this investigation into Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless 
Access in Academia (MAWAA) has been very timely. 
 
1.1  MAWAA project reports 
 
In this series of three reports we describe the results of a year spent investigating 
current perceived issues with the deployment of wireless LAN networks in campus 
environments, with the technology available for such deployments, and with 
mechanisms that would allow users to roam as seamlessly as possible between such 
deployments. 
 
The first report “Survey of Wireless LAN Usage and Issues” focuses on the results of 
formal and informal surveys and interviews with UK academic sites, presenting a 
summary of the issues that have been raised over the year since the first formal 
survey was conducted in Q1 2003.  It also presents a summary of technical 
components for wireless LAN deployments and describes specific wireless access 
authentication methods. 
 
The second report “Support for Roaming Access” explores how the main access 
control methods are suited to enable user roaming between wireless deployments.   
This work while undertaken within the scope of MAWAA has also been taken by 
Southampton into both the UKERNA Wireless Advisory Group [WAG] and also the 
TERENA Task Force for Mobility [TF-MOBILITY]. 
 
The third and final report “Deployment Experience” describes a deployment of 
wireless LAN made within the School of Electronics and Computer Science at the 
University of Southampton, using an 802.1x-based solution over a network of some 
30-35 wireless access points. 
 
A glossary of wireless LAN related terms can be found in Deliverable B of the TF-
Mobility working group [TF-MOBILITY], and there is a useful resource of WLAN 
information at the UKERNA Wireless Advisory Group web site [WAG]. 
 
1.2  Deployment experience 
 
In this report we describe local deployment experience of WLAN access control 
mechanisms.  This includes the use of 802.1x for local network access control and a 
trial of RADIUS referrals run in conjunction with other sites with the assistance of 
SURFnet.   We also include our experience of running two access control systems in 
parallel, as a transition path from a simpler system to one with full 802.1x features. 
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2  Choice of Deployment Technology 
 
In this section we describe the ethos behind our decision to pilot 802.1x as an access 
control mechanism in our local wireless network.   The network spans three large 
buildings and required some 30-35 WLAN access points. 
 
2.1  Original system 
 
Like many sites, our original WLAN deployment was very simple, and it also only 
covered basic public areas, with a small number of access points.  Any wireless user 
wishing to use the WLAN would need to visit an administrator, at which point an entry 
for their system’s MAC (Ethernet) address would be entered into a DHCP server 
table, such that when they subsequently connected, they would receive a valid, 
usable IP address. 
 
Such a system has clear weaknesses.   For one, an attacker could observe MAC 
addresses in use, and later pick one to use to gain network access.   If there is no 
control via MAC filtering, IP blocking or, perhaps more usefully, ARP traffic, then an 
attacker could also potentially just pick and use any IP address in the block being 
used.   Any MAC-based system only offers weak authentication. 
 
The system also places a demand on administrator time, to add each entry on 
request. 
 
Because the system is weak, the trust level between the WLAN and the internal 
network is limited, and only certain types of traffic was allowed to the internal, or 
indeed the external, network from the WLAN network. 
 
There were two goals in mind when we chose to deploy a more secure and flexible 
technology.  One was to pick the right technology with some future proofing, the 
other was to do so in a way that allowed a transition path for existing users, and 
perhaps users that as yet had no device or software support for the new technology, 
to follow.    There may also be guest users visiting for a few hours for who an easy, 
simple method is appropriate over a more complex but technically superior one.  This 
implied running two WLAN access control schemes in parallel. 
 
2.2  WLAN technology discussion 
 
The choices for the more secure system were fourfold: 
 
1.  Restrict access from the WLAN network to a trusted VPN server 
2.  Use 802.1x authentication for all WLAN devices 
3.  Deploy a web-redirection based authentication scheme 
4.  Deploy a Roamnode solution 
 
In the following sections we discuss thoughts from discussions we held on the 
candidate technologies. 
2.2.1  Simplicity 
 
In terms of simplicity of deployment, the VPN and web-redirection systems look 
good, and based on informal surveys of what UK universities are deploying, such 
systems, in particular through Bluesocket, are gaining a notable foothold.   These are Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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also the systems used by many commercial WISPs, including BT Openzone for 
example.    
 
Web-redirection solutions typically allow use of RADIUS to assign local policy 
decisions by the “role” group that the authenticated user is placed into, and can thus 
limit (for example) students authenticated via the system to only have external web 
access, while other types of users get richer access.   In principle, 802.1x systems 
can use similar techniques, but they would typically use Layer 2 segregation by 
placing different user classes into different VLANs. 
 
It is interesting to note that BT Openzone allows users to connect for £6 per hour 
using a “scratch” card for the username and password for access.   The card can be 
bought with cash, so there is no way the user can be traced back in the event of a 
hacking incident from an Openzone hotspot.     
2.2.2  Cost 
 
The cost of the APs is also an issue if one wishes to use 802.1x, because the more 
features an AP has, the more expensive it becomes.   The web-redirection and VPN 
systems can use very basic APs, because the authentication is not dependent on the 
AP. 
 
Where a site wishes to deploy parallel access control systems, an AP capable of 
supporting multiple SSIDs and multiple VLANs is required, in which case such a 
system may support the required 802.1x capabilities as well.    A parallel deployment 
may be desirable if a weaker scheme is offered for short-term guests and a stronger 
solution used for long-term local WLAN users.   It may also be used to bridge the 
transition from an existing scheme to a new scheme. 
 
The difference in cost between a Cisco 1200 series AP (with 802.1x, multi-SSID and 
multi-VLAN support) and a plain AP may be at least £200 per AP, possibly £300 or 
more, so it is an issue for a very large deployment.   A more expensive system may 
also have better remote management features, which would be important in a large 
deployment, and simply perform better as an access point (the Cisco Aironet range is 
well rated by most reviews, for example).    The pricing for the more advanced APs is 
generally falling, as the technologies become more mass market and widely 
implemented. 
 
However, one should remember that the Bluesocket solution requires a gateway 
device costing £5,000 or more to control a subnet, and a university may need a 
number of these.   Also, the VPN solution will need an appropriate local VPN 
provision, and if local users can connect to the VPN at 100Mbit/s, that provision may 
be tested significantly in terms of capacity.     
 
The contrast is thus expense at the edge (802.1x) against expense in the inner 
access control systems (web-redirection gateways, VPN servers).   It’s not 
necessarily a clear-cut issue, but when coverage is important, the use of cheaper 
APs is advantageous; the real saving (against feature-rich APs) depends on the 
scalability of the web-redirection and/or VPN capability. 
 
There are open source implementations of web-redirection gateways, e.g. 
NoCatAuth, which can help reduce costs.   The Roamnode solution is also available 
as a free package, requiring only the PC hardware.   It’s also worth noting that Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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HostAP (a free Linux-based AP) supports 802.1x; this is described in the Community 
Wireless section below.  
2.2.3  Roaming support 
 
Based on the assessment of the suitability for roaming support for these methods 
conducted in Section 7.3 of Report 2, there was little to choose between the 
solutions, but that as and when 802.1x support hardened in client devices and 
operating systems, it would probably offer the most flexible method.   If the question 
is where a site may see itself in two years, then the 802.1x to WPA to 802.11i path 
looks to be one that is hardening quickly now. 
 
The “restricted VPN” solution seemed least scalable of all the solutions, and while the 
use of VPNs is attractive, we do not consider it a scheme that can hope to be 
deployed nationally (at hundreds of HE sites) or internationally (at thousands of 
sites), due principally to the management of the VPN server access control list. 
2.2.4  IPv6 support 
 
At our own site, we offer IPv6 connectivity across our whole network.  Thus any 
access control mechanism that does not support IPv6 is going to cause some 
concern.  In practice, most (if not all) IPv6-capable systems are dual-stack, and thus 
if the system can be authorised for IPv4, and then have IPv6 traffic allowed, the 
concern may be reduced.   There are two issues; one is whether the system can 
authenticate a user or device over IPv6 transport, the other is whether it then permits 
IPv6 data to flow.    
 
The web-redirection systems such as Bluesocket and Vernier both currently do not 
support IPv6, and indeed will not allow WLAN users to gain external IPv6 
connectivity.   Thus a dual-stack node could authenticate over IPv4, but no IPv6 
traffic could subsequently be routed off site.   
 
This was a significant issue for our own deployment, though not one that would 
weigh highly necessarily for a typical WLAN site. 
2.2.5  Other considerations 
 
Some other issues arose in discussions. 
 
In the case of web-redirection systems, there may be an issue for sites which use 
web proxies, and the configuration script must be fetched from a server which is 
beyond the access control device.   Allowing HTTP access to this server would mean 
allowing unauthenticated access to internal web pages, because the gateway’s 
access control lists (ACLs) are typically IP-based.   This implies the script needs to 
be held somewhere inside each protected network, or on the gateway itself.   It is a 
point to note for any site using a proxy. 
 
In addition to authenticating to the network (via the RADIUS server, which in turn 
authenticated the AP via a shared secret or IPsec), a user may wish to establish that 
the network they are attaching to is the one they really think it is.  In this case, some 
form of mutual authentication is very desirable.   For 802.1x, all the common types 
bar EAP-MD5 support it.  Both EAP-TTLS (e.g. with MS-CHAP-v2 as an 
authentication protocol that support mutual authentication) and EAP-PEAP can 
support it, using server-side certificates only. EAP-LEAP supports it with no Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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certificates at all, being based on MS-CHAP-v2, but requires strong passwords.   
EAP-TLS has client-side certificates, which are secure, but the usual PKI issues will 
likely limit its widespread adoption.   Where mutual authentication is used, concerns 
over rogue APs can be alleviated. 
 
2.3  Flexibility in deployment 
 
By flexibility we mean both the ability for multiple authentication schemes to coexist, 
and the ability for a new authentication scheme to be introduced in parallel with an 
existing scheme. 
 
For example, deploying 802.1x may be desirable, but not all client devices have 
support.   Thus while gaining experience of 802.1x, e.g. offering users a pilot scheme 
for 6 months on the site, an alternative system needs to be maintained. 
 
As stated above, flexibility means expense, because you will then need support for 
multiple VLANs and SSIDs, and probably good management support. 
 
2.4  Summary 
 
We chose to deploy 802.1x as our primary, strong authentication scheme because: 
 
1.  We see it firmly in the future technology path (WPA, 802.11i); 
 
2.  Being a Layer 2 authentication mechanisms, it is IP version agnostic (we use 
IPv6 across our entire network); 
 
3.  Layer 2 authentication removes many (or some, depending how paranoid you 
are) of the concerns over Layer 3 spoofing attacks; 
 
4.  The roaming support potential is very good; 
 
5.  We felt that the support for Windows XP (SP1) and 2000 (SP4), along with 
MacOS/X (built-in from 10.3) and Linux (through the Linux WPA project) was 
good enough to warrant a pilot deployment; 
 
6.  Other trials (e.g. by SURFnet) had shown positive experiences; 
 
7.  We needed APs with multi-SSID and multi-VLAN capability so that we could 
offer our existing (weak) scheme alongside our new (stronger) scheme, with 
good management capability.  The Cisco 1200 series met this requirement 
and also supported 802.1x; 
 
8.  Our deployment of 30-35 APs meant the cost differential of APs with rich 
functionality was not great.  This may be different on sites with several 
hundred APs; 
 
9.  We already had a Radiator RADIUS deployment, with licences to support the 
additional requirements for 802.1x.   Radiator supports all the required EAP 
types and is both attractively priced and well supported. 
 
The reasons for technology choices will vary from site to site.   While web-redirection 
and VPN based solutions will work, 802.1x has the potential to be more powerful and 
flexible, and has good potential for roaming support.   Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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We had some concerns over VPN scaling on site as well.  Having a large number of 
concurrent wireless users running at potentially 100Mbit/s each would place a strain 
on a VPN server provision, if all users were forced to use it to get access from the 
WLAN.   802.1x has the advantage of spreading the burden across the APs, rather 
than on central servers. 
 
Thus we felt it was most appropriate to focus our pilot deployment on 802.1x within 
the scope of MAWAA.  
 
 
3  Deploying 802.1x 
 
802.1x has emerged over the past two years as a technology, in no small part helped 
by support appearing in major operating systems, i.e. Windows 2000 SP4 and XP 
SP1, as well as Mac OS/X 10.3.   Linux support has been available through the Open 
1X project, though the functionality of that code has not been great; the newer Linux 
WPA project promises a more rosy future.    There are commercial clients for Linux, 
and for many PDAs, but these have a cost.  We don’t see 802.1x becoming 
mainstream until good free clients are available for all platforms. 
 
Information about 802.1x has been made more widely available, helped by 
workshops such as [8021XWS]. 
 
The philosophy at our site has been that we offer 802.1x access as an option.  If our 
users use it, they get access to more services due to the greater strength of the 
authentication scheme.     
 
3.1  Two classes of users 
 
We observed that we have two classes of wireless users and that those two classes 
of users have competing needs.  First, we have the heavy and regular wireless 
users, who need full access to our network and who would be inconvenienced by a 
cumbersome authentication procedure which required them to repeatedly 
authenticate.  Second, we have light and occasional wireless users, who don't need 
full access to our network and who perhaps aren't in a position to install special 
software. 
 
The heavy users would typically be staff and postgraduate students.  The light users 
would include most staff and postgraduate students and also undergraduate students 
and visitors. 
 
Given this distinction, we decided to aim to offer a two distinct wireless services, one 
service based on (strong) EAP-TTLS and the other based on (weak) MAC address 
authentication. 
 
The EAP-TTLS service would in some cases require users to install an authentication 
client, although some operating systems have support built in.  This service would 
provide unrestricted access as if they were connected to our wired network.  EAP-
TTLS would require no further intervention from the user once it was set up.  The 
EAP-TTLS client would silently authenticate on re-connection, saving heavy users 
much annoyance as they moved around the local network.    In reality the early 
deployment included PEAP and EAP-MD5 because of the need to allow Windows Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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2000 and XP users authenticate (prior to availability of the more robust SecureW2 
client from Alfa and Ariss [ALFA]). 
 
The MAC address service would requires users to register using a web page and 
would provide access to a limited set of outbound services, e.g. web, ftp, ssh and 
(perhaps) local VPN services only. 
 
Staff and students would be able to register themselves for these services on the 
web, in the same way they currently do for their dial-up and VPN services.  They 
would provide a username and password and their MAC address. 
 
Visitors to the School would need to have their MAC address registered by a 
sponsoring member of staff.  Again this would be done on the web.  This kind of 
registration would lapse automatically after a short period of time.  By having 
members of staff register visitors, we create a chain of responsibility which would 
allow us to track misuse.   The MAC address can be linked to a member of staff and 
a specific guest (although of course the address can be spoofed). 
 
The Web form for guests simply asks for the MAC address, the guest name and 
affiliation, and the expiry date; the sponsor is also required to be logged in such that 
the sponsor identity is reasonably strongly asserted.   Local users can also manage 
their own MAC addresses, in cases where they have multiple devices. 
 
The configuration was such that we could enforce self or sponsored registration in 
addition to the 802.1x authentication, as a means to know which member of staff 
approved the visitor access to the network.   This is a site policy issue, depending on 
the level of trust the site wishes to place in exactly who is roaming on to the network. 
 
The two-tier scheme requires access points to support multiple SSIDs (given that we 
don't want to have to deploy twice as many APs as necessary).   
 
The software requirements for such an approach would be a RADIUS server (with 
EAP-TTLS support) and a database to manage the expiry of registrations. 
 
We considered a dedicated guest VPN server, with temporary accounts, but felt that 
this was an unnecessary complication. 
 
It was felt that the user registration scheme should be web driven, by the user, and 
not administrator driven.   With many guests coming and going at any one time, the 
drip load on administrative staff over a period of time would add up.   Having a 
member of staff perform the registration both gives us the identity of the visitor and 
someone who can be fingered as responsible for that user while they were on site.    
 
As cited in a later section, we had over 610 different devices/users on our WLAN in 
the most recent 11 month monitoring period.   At 10 minutes setup per person, that 
would be 100 hours, or 3 weeks, of support time in a year.   With new laptops, PDAs 
and visitors always appearing, the burden would be ongoing. 
 
In our discussions with SURFnet we found that for the non-802.1x users they provide 
a captive portal that pops up a webpage that tells the user that they need 802.1x, and 
that offers a download link or installation instructions for the appropriate client.   We 
would recommend such a mechanism for any deployment, both to enable any 
policies to be displayed to visitors, and so they can determine how they can get 
access (via 802.1x on local or – in the longer term – their home credentials, or via 
temporary admission by a sponsoring staff member). Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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3.1.1  Sponsored Guest Access 
 
When we first deployed WLAN in the School, we used static MAC-based access 
control, relying on DHCP allocations to control access.   In essence, very little control 
at all.   Any scheme based on MAC authentication is weak, but it can offer a useful 
“quick and dirty” access mechanism until a stronger scheme is deployed.    
 
An alternative could be to only allow access to the local VPN server, but such a 
scheme would discount visitors from other academic sites from having external 
network access, as well as guests attending project meetings or similar events or 
meetings.    This is a challenge that any national roaming scheme faces as well, of 
course.     
 
It would not be unreasonable for the alternative scheme to be a pure VPN one, if the 
site accepted the limitations that imposed on which guests could use the network, or 
was prepared to configure ACLs to allow guests to have access back to their home 
VPN servers.   Such configurations do not scale well beyond a small number of 
participating sites, as discussed in Report 2. 
3.1.2  Using multiple SSIDs 
 
In running two SSIDs on site we wanted to offer the more open, weaker SSID as the 
broadcast network, but to hide the stronger 802.1x SSID.   We ran into a Windows 
XP “feature”, whereby a broadcast SSID always takes priority over a non-broadcast 
SSID regardless of the order in the list of preferred networks. 
 
We discovered that Windows XP can handle silent SSIDs, but it has to be configured 
in a certain way, which we found meant that: 
 
1.  Windows must be told to connect only to infrastructure networks; 
 
2.  All overlapping non-silent SSIDs must be removed from the list of 
preferred networks. 
 
Windows appears to go into a degenerate mode if it can't hear the broadcast SSID of 
a preferred network.  The degenerate mode searches the list of preferred networks 
for silent SSIDs. 
3.1.3  Using multiple VLANs 
 
The Cisco 1200's that we selected can assign a VLAN per node based on the 
RADIUS response.  Thus hosts authenticating against a remote RADIUS server can 
be placed into a different VLAN to those authenticating locally.    The only barrier to 
such usage may be limitations on the number of available VLAN IDs in local wired 
switching hardware (to which the APs are connected). 
3.1.4  Password considerations 
 
Due to the variety of EAP types in use by different clients, we had to accept the use 
of EAP-TTLS (as planned) but also EAP-PEAP and EAP-MD5.  The latter require 
plaintext passwords.  We store the passwords in a reversibly encrypted form.  Having Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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all the passwords in one place in a recoverable form is not ideal, thus we chose to 
have separate Wireless passwords for our users.     
 
This is not ideal, but we will review the situation as (free and robust) 802.1x client 
support for EAP-TTLS grows.   We plan to migrate to an EAP-TTLS only environment 
during the summer of 2004, in parallel with the planned UKERNA Location 
Independent Networking (LIN) tests. 
 
 
3.2  802.1x Support 
 
In this section we review 802.1x and related support in clients, access points and 
RADIUS products.  
3.2.1  Operating system support 
 
The summary of client support is given in Table 1 below. 
 
 
  Apple 
OS/X 
10.3.x 
M/soft  
Win2K 
WinXP 
Alfa & 
Ariss 
Funk 
Odssey 
3.0 
Mhouse 
AEGIS 
2.2 
Open 
1x 
Project 
Linux 
WPA 
Project 
Wire1x 
Project 
Platform 
Win 95                 
Win 98        Y  Y      Y 
Win 2000    Y  Y  Y  Y      Y 
Win NT 4.0 SP6a          Y       
Win ME        Y  Y      Y 
Win XP    Y  Y  Y  Y      Y 
Win CE .NET 4.1          Y       
Pocket PC 2002        Y  Y       
Win Mobile 2003        Y         
Pocket PC 2003      Y (*)    Y       
Palm Tungsten C          Y       
Solaris 8          Y       
Linux          Y  Y  Y   
Sharp Zaurus          Y       
Mac OS/X  Y        Y       
BSD                 
Features 
EAP-TLS  Y  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
EAP-TTLS  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
EAP-PEAP  Y  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Cisco LEAP  Y      Y  Y       
EAP-MD5  Y      Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Cost 
Free?  Y  Y  Y (*N)  N  N  Y  Y  Y 
 
Table 1: Operating system client 802.1x support 
 
For Windows, there is now support for 802.1x in Windows 2000 SP4 and Windows 
XP SP1.   Microsoft’s client provides PEAP/MSCHAPv2 support, but not TTLS.    For 
TTLS, you need a client such as SecureW2 from Alfa and Ariss [ALFA], which is free 
for personal use.   Early versions of the SecureW2 client caused problems for PEAP Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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and were difficult to uninstall, but this has improved since.   The SecureW2 client is 
free for personal use for Windows 2000 and XP, but the Pocket PC 2003 client is 20 
Euros. 
 
On the commercial side, Funk is available for Windows, but in principle it would seem 
more sensible if paying for a client to try the MeetingHouse one (AEGIS), because it 
also supports Linux, the Palm Tungsten C, Sharp Zaurus (a nice Linux PDA), Pocket 
PC 2002 and 2003, Solaris 8 and Mac OS/X.   The latter is not important now given 
the excellent 802.1x support in Mac OS/X since v10.3.   Running one brand simplifies 
support issues.   
 
For Linux there is the Open1x xsupplicant [OPEN1X], the Taiwanese WIRE1x project 
[WIRE1X] or, more recently and perhaps most promisingly, the Linux WPA 
[LINUXWPA] project.   The implementation of WIRE1x is based on Open1x.   Our 
experience of Open1x was not positive; it clearly experienced growing pains.  While it 
is improving, we believe the Linux WPA project may offer the better long term 
solution, given its broader scope. 
 
One should also consider the support in wireless cards. [UTAH] has a list of wireless 
cards that do 182-bit WEP and that support AEGIS 802.1x, for example.  
Experiments at ARNES successfully tested Meetinghouse Aegis 2.1.0 and Funk 
Odyssey 802.1x clients on Windows 98SE, ME, 2000 and XP.  However some 
WLAN cards work fine with both clients, some cards just with one of them.   This 
situation is improving quickly though.  According to Microsoft "all major NIC vendors 
support 802.1X and most have released Windows drivers that support it." 
 
The Table lists known functions only.  Other “minority” features, such as EAP-SIM, 
were not surveyed. 
 
The pricing for Funk and Meetingouse clients is around $40-$50 US per client, but 
academic discounts can be obtained, along with bulk deals.   For a large deployment, 
this may still be costly.   Widespread 802.1x adoption will come only when the core 
operating systems have good built-in support for all common EAP types. 
 
There is an (open source) Windows EAP project at the University of Utah that builds 
EAP modules that implement the Windows EAP API [WEAP]. 
 
The Open1x project dropped Mac OS/X support plans due to Apple’s work. 
 
In principle, there are free 802.1x EAP-TTLS clients available now for all the main 
laptop platforms (Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP1, Mac OS/X 10.3 and Linux), though 
FreeBSD we believe is still lacking.  Clients for PDA devices are still in the 
commercial domain only, which is a problem that remains to be solved. 
3.2.2  Access Point support 
 
802.1x is fully supported in many products, including the Orinoco AP2000, and the 
Cisco 350 and 1200 series.   Support is emerging quickly, and prices falling.    The 
more expensive APs may have multiple SSID and VLAN support as well. 
 
VLAN technology is still in early deployment stages in some sites, but is growing 
more common in most major campuses.  Multiple VLAN support may be useful for 
even just a single authentication mechanism, where the lookup result may indicate 
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3.2.3  RADIUS server support 
 
The main issue for the RADIUS server is which EAP mechanisms they support.    
 
In recent months the major packages – including Radiator, FreeRADIUS and Steel-
Belted RADIUS – have all produced support for EAP-TLS, TTLS, PEAP and MD-5 as 
well as LEAP.    Thus there is little to choose in terms of functionality.   
 
Radiator is especially good at pattern matching which is important for proxying, and 
thus for the (inter)national RADIUS referral hierarchy that is arising out of the 
MAWAA and similar work. 
 
For our own purposes we chose Radiator because it supports TLS, TTLS (including 
PAP, CHAP, MSCHAPV1 and MSCHAPV2), PEAP and LEAP, with dynamic WEP 
keys for PEAP, TLS and TTLS.   In addition it is attractively priced, has excellent 
support (from a very small team), and is written in Perl so can easily be modified if 
required. 
 
As of v3.9, Radiator supports IPv6 transport. 
 
3.3  Infrastructure installation 
 
The infrastructure deployment consists of RADIUS server (in our case Radiator) and 
access point (Cisco 1200 series) configuration. 
 
We do not detail here specifics of site surveys; we used an informal method to place 
our APs, which proved adequate without the expense of a formal site survey. 
 
Our Radiator server (initially v3.7.1) was running on a Sparc Solaris system, but we 
plan to migrate to either Intel Linux or Intel Solaris in the near future.    This system 
sat in our servers subnet. 
 
The APs were all set up in a wired DMZ off our core firewall device.   Thus any user 
attaching to our WLAN would be outside our School’s network from the firewall 
perspective.    If they used MAC-based authentication they would be admitted by a 
limited set of protocols.   If they used 802.1x, they would be placed in a different 
VLAN that offered much greater internal network access. 
 
We ran two Radiator servers, such that one was primary for 802.1x authentication 
and the other primary for MAC-based authentication. 
 
Appendix A shows our Radiator configuration file for 802.1x authentication (TTLS, 
PEAP and MD5), while Appendix B shows the authentication for our sponsored 
MAC-based access control scheme.    
 
Appendix C is the Radiator file listing the UK proxy details.  Appendix D lists (some 
of) our access points. 
 
Appendix E shows the configuration of one of our Cisco 1200 Aironet APs. 
 
3.4  Client installation 
 
We have made instructions available for our users for the Windows, Mac OS/X and 
Linux clients.    Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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In our network, the SSID ECS-WLAN is our “less trusted” network, while ECS-EAP is 
the SSID that users wishing to use 802.1x should associate with. 
3.4.1  Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP1 
 
As part of the deployment, a server side certificate needs to be generated.  This will 
take the form: 
 
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 
MIIDfTCCAuagAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADCBjDELMAkGA1UEBhMCR0Ix 
EDAOBgNVBAgTB0VuZ2xhbmQxDjAMBgNVBAcTBVNvdG9uMQwwCgYDVQQKEwNVb1Mx 
DDAKBgNVBAsTA0VDUzEYMBYGA1UEAxMPZWNzLnNvdG9uLmFjLnVrMSUwIwYJKoZI 
hvcNAQkBFhZzeXNqamhAZWNzLnNvdG9uLmFjLnVrMB4XDTAzMDYxMDEwMjAyN1oX 
DTA1MDYwOTEwMjAyN1owgYwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMRAwDgYDVQQIEwdFbmdsYW5k 
MQ4wDAYDVQQHEwVTb3RvbjEMMAoGA1UEChMDVW9TMQwwCgYDVQQLEwNFQ1MxGDAW 
BgNVBAMTD2Vjcy5zb3Rvbi5hYy51azElMCMGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYWc3lzampoQGVj 
cy5zb3Rvbi5hYy51azCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAyd+reQFU 
isdiWmpdfW4y61PTa9vxT5HE+oOEiFixT1P5+dqeSPilfbGW9ByVqhkIXcWuWdoM 
KIDodcmsYm5dSYJJSUSUZ5uPSuZhcX6kKBRGYES+BuNCuqexCWwdDa13FMtQeIpK 
HEZv43I9BK+koW7inw9ojFlUCVSew9wV1TMCAwEAAaOB7DCB6TAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU 
tFJL8qcyG4rVOuExlVjwLvem6t4wgbkGA1UdIwSBsTCBroAUtFJL8qcyG4rVOuEx 
lVjwLvem6t6hgZKkgY8wgYwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMRAwDgYDVQQIEwdFbmdsYW5k 
MQ4wDAYDVQQHEwVTb3RvbjEMMAoGA1UEChMDVW9TMQwwCgYDVQQLEwNFQ1MxGDAW 
BgNVBAMTD2Vjcy5zb3Rvbi5hYy51azElMCMGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYWc3lzampoQGVj 
cy5zb3Rvbi5hYy51a4IBADAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAA4GB 
AAwTB/h/eH0iepd/OgXYkSuCFXGh1CDnzC+WLS5Ga11bNlxAq79WKfjOjmNigiJ1 
oPJYSDvGSowGVjInWsZNgfg0ErQVTtAhXqWiFHjMYGGUYws8lwHmlu/BWKLBjtV2 
RzwWRD5/FpepQldrUg7Wq2daub7lYpdN3UzpcstZ+MFX 
-----END CERTIFICATE----- 
 
The specific instructions for Windows, for use with PEAP, are then as follows.    
 
This example is lengthier than the Linux and Mac OS/X example below, because in 
the first example we are detailing the whole certificate installation procedure – if you 
don’t do this installation, the server will present the certificate the first time you 
connect. 
•  Ensure your wireless cards MAC address (a hardware address in hexadecimal 
usually printed on the outside of the wireless card) is registered (in the sponsor-
approved web scheme). 
•  Go to Client Manager, add a new profile and set SSID to ECS-EAP.  
•  Ensure network type is access point.  
•  Ensure WEP is on and set to 11111 (HEX 3131313131).  
•  Place the certificate (see above) on your desktop.  
•  Add certification by doing following.  
o  (Win 2000) Open users and passwords in control panel.  
o  (Win 2000) On advanced tab click certificates.  
o  (Win 2000) In certificate manager click import and follow instructions 
onscreen. 
o  (Win XP) Add certificates snap-in to MMC console adding Current User (see 
Help for details).  
o  (Win XP) Click on certificates-Current User and then Trusted Root 
Certification Authorities.  
o  (Win XP) Click on Action then All Tasks then Import to start Wizard.  
o  (Win XP) Import Certificate from desktop.  
•  Click on control panel then network connections.  Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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Figure 1: Server certificate screen on Windows XP configuration 
 
•  Click on network connection relating to your wireless connection and click on 
properties.  
o  (Windows 2000) Click on authentication and ensure the 802.1x box is ticked.  
o  (Windows 2000) Click on properties then validate server certificates, ensure 
ecs.soton.ac.uk in the list of certificates is ticked (see picture).  
o  (Windows 2000) Click on configure and uncheck box 
o  (Windows XP) Click on wireless connection then advanced.  
o  (Windows XP) Ensure "Access point (infrastructure) networks only" is clicked.  
o  (Windows XP) Ensure "Automatically connect to non-preferred networks" is 
unchecked.  
o  (Windows XP) Click on ECS-EAP and then properties then the Authentication 
tab.  
o  (Windows XP) Click on authentication and ensure the 802.1x box is ticked.  
o  (Windows XP) Click on properties then validate server certificates, ensure 
ecs.soton.ac.uk in the list of certificates is ticked (see picture).  
o  (Windows XP) Click on configure and uncheck box.  
•  Connect to WLAN.  
•  Type in your user name (Email address) and password in the box when it appears. 
This configuration uses only built-in features of Windows 2000 SP4 or Windows XP 
SP1.  It would be desirable to offer a TTLS-only environment (we plan to test this 
next), but doing so requires the SecureW2 client to be installed on Windows 2000 or 
XP, which potentially adds to the support load. Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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The policy for setting and maintaining usernames and passwords for the 802.1x 
access is one for the deploying site to determine.   In our own deployment, we began 
with separate passwords to the regular system ones, and 802.1x users would 
authenticate using their regular username, and the password they created on the 
(old) MAC-based self-registration scheme.    
3.4.2  Linux 
 
For Linux, we mainly used the Open1X project’s xsupplicant, and EAP-TTLS, as 
follows: 
1. mkdir -p /usr/src/802/xsup 
2. cd /usr/src/802/xsup wget http://www.open1x.org/xsupplicant-cvs-current.tar.gz  
3. tar zxvf xsupplicant-cvs-current.tar.gz  
4. cd xsupplicant-cvs-current  
5. ./configure make  
6. make install  
7. Once you have done that you need to configure the 1x.conf file (see below) inserting 
your password and name in relevant place and put it in /etc/1x/ .  
8. Next you have to copy the certificate (see above) to /etc/1x/certs/.  
9. Open a terminal as root.  
10. Type /sbin/iwconfig eth1 essid ECS-EAP key 3131313131 
11. Type /sbin/ifconfig eth1 up  
12. Type xsupplicant -i eth1   
13. You will have to precede this with the directory name where you have stored 
xsupplicant unless it is on your root path. 
14. 'eth1' is assumed to be the name of device on which your wireless network card is. 
Adjust as appropriate.  
The 1x.conf file appears as follows: 
 
ECS-EAP : id = your email address including @ecs.soton.ac.uk   
ECS-EAP : root = /etc/1x/certs/CAroot.pem 
ECS-EAP : auth = none 
ECS-EAP : type = wireless  
ECS-EAP : pref = ttls 
ECS-EAP : password = your password when registering mac address 
ECS-EAP : phase2auth = PAP 
ECS-EAP : random_file = /dev/random 
ECS-EAP : first_auth = "/sbin/ifup eth1" 
ECS-EAP : after_auth = "/bin/echo I authenticated" 
 
We are more recently piloting the Linux WPA client, which we believe has a broader 
functionality and a better long-term future. 
3.4.3  Mac OS/X 
 
For Mac OS/X, 802.1x is included, and as easy to use as a new VPN connection.   
You set up a new 802.1x connection in the Internet Connection menu, and select 
TTLS as the EAP type in the configuration screen. 
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Figure 2: Selecting EAP type in the Mac OS/X 802.1x configuration 
 
Mac OS/X 10.3 or later has this support built-in. 
 
 
3.5  Usage monitoring 
 
We have used a variety of methods to monitor our 802.1x and MAC-based 
authentication scheme usage. 
 
The overall usage level is gathered by polling APs for connected device data.   The 
results are processed by a Perl script and then displayed on our internal systems 
resources pages using MRTG. 
 
We have recorded the usage data since March 2004, and have seen a maximum 
simultaneous user count of 45, with the average being 16 users.   It is interesting that 
a few systems are left on overnight.  We believe these are “desktop” laptops, but 
some desktop PCs with wireless NICs. 
 
In addition to the MRTG plots from AP queries, we also log all accesses via 802.1x or 
MAC-based controls.   Examples of the logged data can be seen in Appendix F 
(802.1x) and Appendix G (MAC).   The logging allows a variety of useful statistics to 
be gathered, including traffic volume in the session, the EAP type used, the AP that 
the device associated with, and the session length.   It is possible to determine where 
a device last was used (the accuracy depending on the coverage of the AP), for 
example. 
 
When a user or device needs to be locked out from the network, the database entry 
can be flagged, causing the RADIUS lookup to fail.   We configure the APs to re-
authenticate clients periodically, so that an admitted client can be disconnected if 
required (e.g. if the client is deemed by Snort or a similar IDS to be infected with a 
worm or virus of some particular kind).   Automating such a process would be an 
interesting exercise. Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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`Weekly' Graph (30 Minute Average) 
 
Max users: 36.0 Users  Average users:15.0 Users  Current users: 31.0 Users 
 
‘Monthly' Graph (2 Hour Average) 
 
Max users: 40.0 Users  Average users:14.0 Users  Current users: 17.0 Users 
 
`Yearly' Graph (1 Day Average) 
 
Max users: 45.0 Users  Average users:13.0 Users  Current users: 12.0 Users 
 
Figure 3: MRTG plots of simultaneous WLAN user statistics 
 
The logs show over 36,000 authenticated session IDs over the last 11 month period, 
which is around 150 sessions per working day, on average.   The majority of those 
authentications used the MAC-based scheme, but use of 802.1x grew over the 
period. 
 
There were over 640 different devices/users authenticating in that period. 
 
4  RADIUS Hierarchy Deployment 
 
One of the key attractions of deploying 802.1x as an alternative for our users was to 
support roaming access.    
 
As discussed in Report 2, the most efficient mechanism to support the authentication 
between sites is to deploy a hierarchy for RADIUS referrals, from sites to a national 
proxy, and from each national proxy to a European proxy.   In our case, that meant 
that unknown referrals should be passed to a UK scope proxy. 
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The experiments we conducted here have led to the UKERNA Location Independent 
Networking (LIN) pilot, and a parallel new project (LICHEN, featuring Southampton, 
Bristol and Manchester) studying what additional services may be RADIUS 
authenticated on top of such a scheme if deployed. 
 
The UK proxy is being deployed by Bristol for the LIN pilot, but in our early work 
SURFnet deployed a test proxy for the UK and European levels.   This was also in 
support of an undergraduate project being built by a student in the Netherlands. 
 
4.1  Local RADIUS and credentials 
 
Locally, our credentials are held in an SQL Server database.   Credentials are held in 
Radiator's "rcrypt" reversible encryption.  rcrypt is a simple scheme which uses MD5 
to build a stream cypher.  The key is stored in plain-text in Radiator's configuration 
file. 
 
The Radiator RADIUS server uses Tabular Data Stream (TDS) to query the remote 
SQL server.    We use the FreeTDS library and DBD::Sybase Perl module for 
database access.   We ran Radiator v3.7.1 for most of the reporting period.   The 
latest version is 3.9 at the time of writing. 
 
We offer support for EAP-TTLS (for Linux and OS/X users), PEAP (most Windows 
users, until we deploy the SecureW2 client widely) and EAP-MD5.  The inner 
authentication used by TTLS and PEAP is MSCHAP-v2. 
 
4.2  Hierarchy 
 
There is an interesting RFC [RFC2607] on Proxy Chaining and Policy 
Implementation in Roaming.   This details some of the issues and technology.   The 
roaming work done with the UKERNA WAG and TERENA TF-Mobility WG is 
discussed in Report 2. 
 
In this section we describe our initial proof of concept tests for the RADIUS referral 
hierarchy, conducted with SURFnet. 
 
The main configuration task is to set up the shared secret for the RADIUS server 
pair, so each administrator needs to know the secret and the remote server name/IP 
address.   A local configuration for Radiator would appear like this: 
 
<Client proxy-radius-server.surfnet.nl> 
Secret xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Identifier SURFnet-Proxy-ID 
</Client> 
<Handler Client-Identifier=/^(?!SURFnet-Proxy-ID$)/, Realm=/.*/> 
<AuthBy RADIUS> 
Host proxy-radius-server.surfnet.nl 
Host proxy-fallback-radius-server.surfnet.nl 
Secret xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
AuthPort 1812 
AcctPort 1813 
Retries 1 
StripFromReply Tunnel-Type,Tunnel-Medium-Type 
StripFromReply Tunnel-Private-Group-ID 
AddToReply Tunnel-Type=VLAN,Tunnel-Medium-Type=Ether_802 
AddToReply Tunnel-Private-Group-ID=117 
</AuthBy> 
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As an experiment, we set up local users at each site, and for example verified access 
by Tim.Chown@guest.showcase.surfnet.nl (as an “honourary” Dutch user) from the 
local Southampton site. 
 
There may be some extra complexity when subrealms are used.  One disadvantage 
of allowing subrealms is that you have to filter for authentication loops.  If you're not 
filtering, then any user that uses a non-existing realm can create a loop, since both 
RADIUS servers don't know how to answer the request they forward the request with 
their catchall realm.  You have to use Handlers in this case, instead of Realms. You 
can filter with something like: 
 
#uk-tlr.showcase.surfnet.nl 
<Client 192.87.116.46> 
        Secret (the secret you gave me) 
        Identifier UK-TLR-PROXY 
</Client> 
#include your own clients 
 
#put your own handlers here 
<Handler Realm=soton.ac.uk> 
</Handler> 
<Handler Realm=ecs.soton.ac.uk> 
</Handler> 
 
#and finally forward all other requests to the uk-tlr 
<Handler Client-Identifier=/^(?!UK-TLR-PROXY$)/, Realm=/.*/> 
        <AuthBy RADIUS> 
                #uk-tlr.showcase.surfnet.nl 
                Host            192.87.116.46 
                Secret          xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
                AuthPort        1812 
                AcctPort        1813 
                RetryTimeout    8 
                Retries         0 
        </AuthBy> 
</Handler> 
 
This configuration was tested and shown working in late Summer 2003.  A proof of 
concept of a three-tier referral system was validated.   There were two proxy servers, 
one in Amsterdam and one in Nijmegen, etlr1.radius.terena.nl (192.87.36.6) and 
etlr2.radius.terena.nl (195.169.131.2). 
 
Appendices A and C show the Radiator referral configurations in context. 
 
The real UK proxy server is now being deployed in the LIN project by Bristol.  We 
expect SURFnet to continue to provide a European level proxy on behalf of 
TERENA.   The experiments will be continued, with more formal testing, in the LIN 
project.   
 
 
5  IPv6 Implications 
 
IPv6 is an emerging new technology that will grow in importance in coming years.  All 
the major European research networks now have an IPv6 service, many – including 
JANET in the UK – carrying IPv6 natively on their backbones in dual-stack IPv4/IPv6 
mode. 
 
At our own site, we have an extensive IPv6 deployment spanning our School network 
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wire on almost all our existing IPv6 subnets, using protocol-based VLANs to overlay 
congruent IPv6 links on IPv4 subnets.   This coverage includes our WLAN network. 
 
We are in the process of deploying production support for Mobile IPv6, now that this 
standard has been finalised and implementations are becoming available (e.g. the 
Cisco IOS Home Agent and the MIPL Linux client package). 
 
As a result, it is important that our WLAN authentication scheme is IP agnostic, or at 
least that IPv6 accessed can be enabled from a dual-stack terminal.   Most devices 
will remain dual-stack for some time to come in European academic networks at least 
(the situation may be different in Asia for example), and thus if external IPv6 access 
can be opened by authentication over IPv4, at least some functionality is enabled. 
 
The web-redirection method is notably problematic.  If an IPv6 enabled machine and 
browser tries to access a web server registered with an AAAA record in the DNS, the 
browser will try to connect over IPv6 first, and fail.  However, it is likely that the web 
server is dual stack and also has an A record, so the browser should fall back to that, 
probably after some delay.   The main problem though is that systems such as 
Bluesocket have no means to open IPv6 access externally, thus at present any IPv6 
communications would be blocked from such a WLAN. 
 
Work is required in this area, e.g. to study adding IPv6 capability to NoCatAuth, the 
open source web-redirection control system. 
 
The VPN solution requires an IPv6 VPN service.   Some IPv6 support for VPN clients 
is emerging, though this is still in its relative infancy.   Thus at present it is unlikely 
that a restricted VPN solution would be used for IPv6. 
 
Roamnode is currently an IPv4-only system. 
 
However, 802.1x has the advantage of being a Layer 2 access control mechanism, 
and thus able to support access control for any IP version; the protocol authenticates 
the user or device at the Ethernet layer.    The RADIUS referral from the AP can still 
be run over IPv4, be looked up, and allow the IPv6-capable device to be admitted at 
Layer 2 based on the returned result. 
 
If the RADIUS authentication is required over IPv6, then v3.9 of Radiator offers IPv6 
support.   IPv6 support is not yet present in commercial APs, but the HostAP Linux 
package [HOSTAP] can enable IPv6 from the AP if an IPv6-only environment is 
desired.  
 
Thus at present the only practical mechanism for IPv6 WLAN network access is 
802.1x. 
 
 
6  University Outreach: Community Wireless 
 
The Southampton Open Wireless Network (SOWN) is a community wireless network 
situated in and around the University campus, aimed at offering outreach to staff and 
students around the area, and possibly to other non-commercial users. 
 
There is an interesting community WLAN deployment technical guide at [MUDD]. 
 Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
22 of 46  22
The School supports SOWN as a beneficial access mechanism for our staff and 
students. 
 
We report on it here as we are now in the process of setting up 802.1x based 
referrals between the SOWN and School networks (as well as other trials, e.g. using 
Mobile IPv6 between the networks). 
 
6.1  Overview 
 
The SOWN network provides outdoor wireless access and the capability to get 
internet access via wireless from their homes. 
 
The access points themselves are run without authentication or encryption allowing 
anybody to connect.  Restricted Internet access is available through some members 
donating connectivity from their home ADSL lines.  Since such access is anonymous 
it is typically subject to heavy port filtering, transparent filtering web proxies, 
bandwidth limiting etc.  Such restrictions are in place to protect those people sharing 
connectivity. 
 
6.2  Technical Setup 
 
The original design was for a mesh network; this is a network on which all the access 
points run on the same channel and forward data between each other.  To do this we 
used PCs running Linux and the HostAP driver [HOSTAP], which supports running 
certain wireless cards as an Access Point. 
 
The HostAP driver also supports simultaneous wireless bridging, that is it supports 
linking with neighbouring access points which have been likewise configured.  
Because of this advanced functionality we refer to these access points as “nodes” to 
avoid confusion with standard hardware. 
 
Commercial access points such as the Orinoco AP-2000 also have this capability, 
however all of these links are bridged together limiting topologies and scalability. 
 
Each node in the network is allocated a unique IP range within the RFC1918 private 
IP address range, in particular the 10.0.0.0/8 range, typically as a /24 or /25.  We run 
OSPF on each of the nodes to exchange routes. 
 
Sites are encouraged to peer with the SOWN network, and advertise their global IP 
space to the network.  Currently this means making private addresses routable, 
however we are hoping to get a public allocation in the near future, and have 
obtained RIPE membership towards this goal. 
 
6.3  Deployment Experiences 
 
We initially deployed a network consisting of four nodes, two were located on 
campus and the other two in students houses - on opposite sides of campus and 
thus not within range of each other.  The distance between nodes ranged from 200 to 
500m.  Latency was typically 5ms per hop. 
 
We discovered that throughput fell off rapidly over multiple hops, this is because the 
packet needs to be three hops away before the node can re-transmit. 
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Consequently throughput is reduced to 1/3
rd of normal capacity.  Whilst some 
reduction in capacity was expected this level of severity came as a surprise. 
 
We may have experienced better results with a full(er) meshed network.  However, 
deployment has since been refocused on a more planned network, neighbouring 
nodes have been placed on different channels and links between them use dedicated 
wireless hardware.  This avoids interference and thus any fall in throughput. 
 
6.4  Link with Electronics and Computer Science 
 
We have two machines which are connected to both the University network and 
SOWN. 
 
The first of these is a NAT router capable of translating PPTP VPN traffic, it publishes 
host routes onto the SOWN network for the existing departmental VPN servers.  This 
ensures that users of SOWN can use their existing VPN setup. 
 
The second is a dedicated VPN server running Poptop (a Linux PPTP VPN server 
[POPTOP]).  This provides internet access for Undergraduate students which they 
are otherwise unable to get via the departmental servers. 
 
The server authenticates against the same RADIUS servers used for the School’s 
802.1x wireless service. 
 
6.5  Authentication Service 
 
In addition to the mesh network described previously, SOWN has also been working 
on an authentication service designed to allow people to share their ADSL line 
securely. 
 
The system (called SOWN-1x) is based around the 802.1x protocol which can be 
found in an increasing number of cheap, home/office products [DLINK].  We used 
server-side enhancements to the Radiator RADIUS server to allow users to define 
“communities” of people who may use their access points. 
 
Users need to register and log in to an SSL secured website 
(http://auth.sown.org.uk). 
 
Once registered a user can add their access points; this consists of a name, RADIUS 
secret, the public IP addresses RADIUS requests will come from and optionally 
location information.  Access points can be located behind a typical home broadband 
router/firewall since RADIUS packets traverse NAT without issue. 
 
Once the access point has been registered the user can create or request to join a 
community.  Communities are simply groups of people, one or more of which may be 
administrators.  Administrators are responsible for approving the addition of new 
members into the community, which entails checking their identity.  Currently the only 
online method to check identity is verification of the user’s email address.  The 
recommended method is a face to face meeting between an administrator and user. 
 
Once a user has been accepted into a community they can add their access points to 
it.  This allows other users in the community to authenticate on those access points 
and vice-versa. 
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Users and access points can belong to more than one community, for example you 
could define one community for your friends and another for your family and allow 
both to use the same access point. 
 
Currently communities cannot trust each other, however this is planned in the near 
future.  We would also like to add proxy support for communities, allowing them to 
define their own realms and RADIUS servers for so as not to be dependant on our 
infrastructure. 
 
RADIUS Accounting is supported, this logs whenever users connects to an access 
point, how long for and the total traffic transferred (if supported).  These details are 
made available to the owner of the access point in question. 
 
The system aims to promote sharing between large numbers of people.  SOWN 
believes it offers a practical yet secure solution to sharing home access points with 
others, without the risks generally associated with running openly. 
 
Another possible project that may emerge from SOWN is using SOWN nodes to do 
rogue AP detection.  We could run Kismet daily at an off-peak time and hand the 
results to the University Computing Services. 
 
We have also developed some WLAN-based positioning software that we are looking 
to deploy on both the SOWN and ECS networks.   The accuracy indoors can be as 
good as 2-3m, but depends on the precise environment (offices, open labs, etc). 
 
 
7  Conclusions and further work 
 
The MAWAA project has included a broader scope than initially planned.   The work 
has contributed to the UKERNA Wireless Advisory Group (WAG) and the TERENA 
TF-Mobility WG, both of which we sit on.    Both group have produced reports, the 
TERENA group in some detail. 
 
The work has also been widely disseminated in the UK academic community via the 
annual Networkshop and a dedicated UKERNA Wireless LAN event [WAGCONF].   
We have also presented results at the Internet 2 Spring Meeting in 2004, with a view 
to collaboration on potential (and at this stage it is potential) Shibboleth integration.   
 
The results will feed both into the emerging UKERNA Location Independent 
Networking (LIN) pilot, and a new JISC-funded project called LICHEN in which we 
plan, along with Manchester and Bristol plus collaboration from SURFnet, to see 
what other value-add RADIUS authenticated services can be piggy-backed on the 
LIN.   LICHEN also addresses the Shibboleth integration question. 
 
In our local deployment we have deployed 802.1x in parallel to a weaker, but 
convenient, self-registered MAC-based scheme.   We plan to migrate towards the 
802.1x scheme in the coming months, phasing out MAC-based access.   Running 
two schemes in parallel offers a transition path, but does require higher-end APs to 
work. 
 
Currently we use EAP-TTLS, EAP-PEAP and EAP-MD5, but with the emergence of 
the SecureW2 client [ALFA], as well as the new Linux WPA client, we feel more able 
to migrate towards a TTLS only deployment.   We also expect to phase out MD5 
support, as it is a weak protocol (e.g. with respect to man-in-the-middle attacks).   As Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Access in Academia (MAWAA)  Report 3: Deployment Experience 
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TTLS support grows further, particularly in free clients for PDAs, we expect 802.1x 
deployment to become more mainstream. 
 
7.1  Future authentication work 
 
There are a number of areas and activities we plan to pursue in the WLAN 
authentication scope: 
 
1.  Participation in UKERNA’s LIN pilot, validating larger-scale national and 
international roaming; 
 
2.  Through the LICHEN project, looking at packages like mod_auth_radius that 
allows any Apache web server to become a RADIUS client for authentication 
and accounting, or using RADIUS enabled GINA modules or PAM for “public 
terminal” authentication.   The Shibboleth aspect will be particularly 
interesting; 
 
3.  The mutual authentication issue, investigating methods to reliably mutually 
authenticate, to counter the rogue AP problem.   This may involve ensuring 
mutual methods such as TTLS are widely used; 
 
4.  Participation in the successor to TF-Mobility (under the auspices of TERENA), 
and in the new GEANT project (Joint Research Activity 5, JRA5); 
 
5.  There is plenty of work to do in investigating RADIUS policy options, and user 
semantics, if a common national scheme is to be proposed.  This again 
includes Shibboleth consideration, e.g. UKeduPerson; 
 
6.  Making our own deployment TTLS only, to avoid the password issues 
mentioned above; 
 
7.  Looking further down the 802.11i path, now that the standard is ratified; 
 
8.  Using 802.1x between the SOWN and School networks; 
 
9.  Monitoring of service availability, which will become more important as the 
future LIN deployment reaches production status; 
 
10. Encouraging UKERNA or JANET-CERT to produce guidance on key issues, 
e.g. subtle yet often-avoided questions like “what is a reasonable access 
control mechanism to ensure you meet the JANET AUP but also your civil 
responsibilities?” 
 
 
7.2  Other related future work 
 
We also have other planned work in the wireless domain, including: 
 
1.  IPv6 deployment issues, including IPv6 authentication (e.g. IPv6 capability for 
NoCatAuth); 
 
2.  Mobile IPv6 operation between SOWN and the School networks; 
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3.  Investigating methods to test and quarantine “infected” WLAN devices, or to 
security scan them before network admission; 
 
4.  Management of large WLAN networks, through the IETF capwap WG; 
 
5.  QoS on WLANs; 
 
6.  The relationship between 3GPP Release 6 and WLANs; 
 
7.  Deployment of some form of “abuse” tracking; SURFnet has begun work in 
this area: http://www.sourceforge.net/projects/usertracking. 
 
It is clear that the WLAN area will remain a strong area of interest for most 
universities for some time to come. 
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9  Appendix A: RADIUS configuration for 802.1x 
 
# 
# RADIUS configuration for ECS. 
# 
# 
 
# 
# for debugging configuration, uncomment this lot: 
# 
#Foreground 
#LogStdout 
#Trace 4 
 
AuthPort 1645 
AcctPort 1646 
# 
# the log directory, where the accounting details file and the logs go. 
# 
LogDir /var/adm/radius 
# 
# the database directory, where the dictionaries and the users files live. 
# 
DbDir /usr/local/radiator/etc 
 
include /usr/local/radiator/conf/aps.cfg 
include /usr/local/radiator/conf/proxies.cfg 
 
# This is where we authenticate a PEAP request, which will be an EAP 
# request. The username of the request will be unknown, although 
# the identity of the EAP request will be the real username we are 
# trying to authenticate. 
<Handler Realm = ecs.soton.ac.uk, TunnelledByPEAP=1> 
  # Windows XP when configured for a workgroup might send tunnelled user 
names 
  # in the format COMPUTERNAME\username (eg BAKER\mikem). This 
  # will strip the computer name leaving just the user name 
  RewriteUsername s/(.*)\\(.*)/$2/ 
 
        <AuthBy SQL> 
                DBSource DBI:Sybase:server=db.ecs.soton.ac.uk 
                DBUsername wirelessap 
                DBAuth xxxxxxxx 
                AuthSelect SELECT password \ 
                           FROM Wireless_User \ 
                           WHERE username = REPLACE(%0, '@ecs.soton.ac.uk', 
'') \ 
          AND EXISTS \ 
                                       (SELECT email \ 
                                        FROM STAFF \ 
                                        WHERE email = username) 
 
                 # This tells the PEAP client what types of EAP requests 
                 # we will honour 
    EAPType MSCHAP-V2,MD5 
 
    RcryptKey xxxxxxxxx 
    NoDefault 
        </AuthBy> 
</Handler> 
 
# This is where we authenticate a TTLS inner request,  
# The username of the inner request will be anonymous, although 
# the identity of the EAP request will be the real username we are 
# trying to authenticate. 
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        <AuthBy SQL> 
                DBSource DBI:Sybase:server=db.ecs.soton.ac.uk 
                DBUsername wirelessap 
                DBAuth xxxxxxxx 
                AuthSelect SELECT password \ 
                           FROM Wireless_User \ 
                           WHERE username = REPLACE(%0, '@ecs.soton.ac.uk', 
'') \ 
                                  AND EXISTS \ 
                                        (SELECT email \ 
                                         FROM STAFF \ 
                                         WHERE email = username) 
 
 
                RcryptKey xxxxxxxxx 
    NoDefault 
  </AuthBy> 
</Handler> 
 
# 
# authenticate real users for ecs.soton.ac.uk, allowing TTLS and PEAP. 
# note that PEAP needs plaintext or rcrypt passwords. 
# 
<Handler Realm = ecs.soton.ac.uk> 
  # we can't strip the realm here because we wouldn't be 
  # able to proxy the inner-authentication. 
 
        <AuthBy SQL> 
                DBSource DBI:Sybase:server=db.ecs.soton.ac.uk 
                DBUsername wirelessap 
                DBAuth xxxxxxxx 
                AuthSelect SELECT password \ 
                           FROM Wireless_User \ 
         WHERE username = REPLACE(%0, '@ecs.soton.ac.uk', '') 
\ 
                                  AND EXISTS \ 
                                        (SELECT email \ 
                                         FROM STAFF \ 
                                         WHERE email = username) 
 
    RcryptKey zzzzzzzzz 
    NoDefault 
 
    # EAPType sets the EAP type(s) that Radiator will honour. 
    # Options are: MD5-Challenge, One-Time-Password 
    # Generic-Token, TLS, TTLS, PEAP, MSCHAP-V2 
    # Multiple types can be comma separated. With the default (most 
    # preferred) type given first 
    EAPType TTLS,PEAP,MD5 
 
    # EAPTLS_CAFile is the name of a file of CA certificates  
    # in PEM format. The file can contain several CA certificates 
    # Radiator will first look in EAPTLS_CAFile then in 
    # EAPTLS_CAPath, so there usually is no need to set both 
    EAPTLS_CAFile %D/certificates/demoCA/cacert.pem 
 
    # EAPTLS_CAPath is the name of a directory containing CA 
        # certificates in PEM format. The files each contain one  
    # CA certificate. The files are looked up by the CA  
    # subject name hash value 
#    EAPTLS_CAPath 
 
    # EAPTLS_CertificateFile is the name of a file containing 
    # the servers certificate. EAPTLS_CertificateType 
    # specifies the type of the file. Can be PEM or ASN1 
    # defaults to ASN1 
    EAPTLS_CertificateFile %D/certificates/cert-srv.pem 
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    # EAPTLS_PrivateKeyFile is the name of the file containing 
    # the servers private key. It is sometimes in the same file 
    # as the server certificate (EAPTLS_CertificateFile) 
    # If the private key is encrypted (usually the case) 
    # then EAPTLS_PrivateKeyPassword is the key to descrypt it 
    EAPTLS_PrivateKeyFile %D/certificates/cert-srv.pem 
    EAPTLS_PrivateKeyPassword whatever 
 
    # EAPTLS_RandomFile is an optional file containing 
    # randdomness 
#    EAPTLS_RandomFile %D/certificates/random 
 
    # EAPTLS_MaxFragmentSize sets the maximum TLS fragemt 
    # size that will be replied by Radiator. It must be small 
    # enough to fit in a single Radius request (ie less than 4096) 
    # and still leave enough space for other attributes 
    # Aironet APs seem to need a smaller MaxFragmentSize 
    # (eg 1024) than the default of 2048 
    EAPTLS_MaxFragmentSize 1024 
 
    # EAPTLS_DHFile if set specifies the DH group file. It 
    # may be required if you need to use ephemeral DH keys. 
#    EAPTLS_DHFile %D/certificates/cert/dh 
     
 
    # If EAPTLS_CRLCheck is set  and the client presents a 
certificate 
    # then Radiator will look for a certificate revocation list 
(CRL)  
    # for the certificate issuer 
    # when authenticating each client. If a CRL file is not found, 
or 
    # if the CRL says the certificate has neen revoked, the 
authentication will  
    # fail with an error: 
    #   SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:no certificate returned 
    # One or more CRLs can be named with the EAPTLS_CRLFile 
parameter. 
    # Alternatively, CRLs may follow a file naming convention:  
    #  the hash of the issuer subject name  
    # and a suffix that depends on the serial number. 
    # eg ab1331b2.r0, ab1331b2.r1 etc. 
    # You can find out the hash of the issuer name in a CRL with 
    #  openssl crl -in crl.pem -hash -noout 
    # CRLs with tis name convention 
    # will be searched in EAPTLS_CAPath, else in the openssl  
    # certificates directory typically /usr/local/openssl/certs/ 
    # CRLs are expected to be in PEM format. 
    # A CRL files can be generated with openssl like this: 
    #  openssl ca -gencrl -revoke cert-clt.pem 
    #  openssl ca -gencrl -out crl.pem 
    # Use of these flags requires Net_SSLeay-1.21 or later 
    #EAPTLS_CRLCheck 
    #EAPTLS_CRLFile %D/certificates/crl.pem 
    #EAPTLS_CRLFile %D/certificates/revocations.pem 
     
    # Some clients, depending on their configuration, may require 
you to specify 
    # MPPE send and receive keys. This _will_ be required if you 
select 
    # 'Keys will be generated automatically for data privacy' in 
the Funk Odyssey 
    # client Network Properties dialog. 
    # Automatically sets MS-MPPE-Send-Key and MS-MPPE-Recv-Key 
    # in the final Access-Accept 
    AutoMPPEKeys 
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    # You can enable some warning messages from the Net::SSLeay 
    # module by setting SSLeayTrace to an integer from 1 to 4 
    # 1=ciphers, 2=trace, 3=dump data 
    #SSLeayTrace 4 
 
    # You can configure the User-Name that will be used for the 
inner 
    # authentication. Defaults to 'anonymous'. This can be useful 
    # when proxying the inner authentication. If tehre is a realm, 
it can  
    # be used to choose a local Realm to handle the inner 
authentication. 
    # %0 is replaced with the EAP identitiy 
    EAPAnonymous anonymous@ecs.soton.ac.uk 
 
    # You can enable or disable support for TTLS Session Resumption 
and 
    # PEAP Fast Reconnect with the EAPTLS_SessionResumption flag. 
    # Default is enabled 
    #EAPTLS_SessionResumption 0 
 
    # You can limit how long after the initial session that a 
session can be resumed 
    # with EAPTLS_SessionResumptionLimit (time in seconds). 
Defaults to 43200 
    # (12 hours) 
    #EAPTLS_SessionResumptionLimit 10 
  </AuthBy> 
 
  # These hooks fix the problem with some implementations of TTLS, where 
the 
  # accounting requests have the User-Name of anonymous, instead of the 
real 
  # users name. After authenticating the inner TTLS request, the 
  # PostAuthHook caches the _real_ user name in an SQL table, 
  # The PreProcessingHook replaces the 'anonymous' user name in 
accounting requests with the  
  # real user name that was previously cached for the NAS and NAS-Port. 
  # You can see the correct real User-Name logged in the AcctLogFileName 
#  PreProcessingHook file:"goodies/eap_anon_hook.pl" 
#  PostAuthHook file:"goodies/eap_anon_hook.pl" 
  AcctLogFileName %L/detail 
</Handler> 
 
# 
# and finally forward all other requests to the UK top level RADIUS, unless 
# the request is coming from the UK-TLR. 
# 
<Handler Client-Identifier = /^(?!UK-TLR-PROXY$)/> 
  <AuthBy RADIUS> 
    # uk-tlr.showcase.surfnet.nl 
    Host 192.87.116.46 
    Secret zzzzzzzzzzzzzz 
    AuthPort 1812 
    AcctPort 1813 
    RetryTimeout 8 
    Retries 0 
  </AuthBy> 
</Handler> 
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10 Appendix B: RADIUS configuration for MAC auth 
 
# 
# RADIUS configuration for ECS.  This file authenticates MAC addresses. 
# 
# 
 
# 
# for debugging configuration, uncomment this lot: 
# 
#Foreground 
#LogStdout 
#Trace 4 
 
AuthPort 1812 
AcctPort 1813 
 
# 
# the log directory, where the accounting details file and the logs go. 
# 
LogDir /var/adm/radius 
# 
# the database directory, where the dictionaries and the users files live. 
# 
DbDir /usr/local/radiator/etc 
 
include /usr/local/radiator/conf/aps.cfg 
 
# 
# authenticate MAC addresses.  a MAC address is anything that looks 
# vaguely like one.  APs can't be trusted to use a reasonable format. 
# 
<Handler Realm = ecs.soton.ac.uk, User-Name = /^[\da-f]{2}[\-\:\.]?[\da-
f]{2}[\-\:\.]?[\da-f]{2}[\-\:\.]?[\da-f]{2}[\-\:\.]?[\da-f]{2}[\-\:\.]?[\da-
f]{2}\@ecs\.soton\.ac\.uk$/i> 
  # Strip the realm from all requests, because our 
  # database only has user names (no realm) 
  RewriteUsername       s/^([^@]+).*/$1/ 
 
  # strip out all the separators and uppercase it. 
  RewriteUsername  s/[\-\:\.]//g 
  RewriteUsername  tr/a-f/A-F/ 
 
  # 
  # Cisco and Orinoco use different MAC authentication schemes. 
  # try both. 
  # 
  <AuthBy GROUP> 
    AuthByPolicy ContinueUntilAccept 
    # 
    # Cisco APs use the lowercase MAC as the password. 
    # 
    <AuthBy SQL> 
      DBSource DBI:Sybase:server=db.ecs.soton.ac.uk 
      DBUsername wirelessap 
      DBAuth xxxxxxxx 
      AuthSelect SELECT lower(mac) AS password \ 
           FROM Wireless_MAC \ 
           WHERE mac = %0 \ 
           AND (expdate IS NULL OR GETDATE() < expdate)\ 
           AND (username = '*' OR EXISTS \ 
          (SELECT email \ 
           FROM STAFF \ 
           WHERE email = username)) 
      NoDefault 
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    # 
    # Orinoco APs use the RADIUS secret as the password. 
    # 
                <AuthBy SQL> 
                        DBSource DBI:Sybase:server=db.ecs.soton.ac.uk 
                        DBUsername wirelessap 
                        DBAuth xxxxxxxx 
                        AuthSelect SELECT 'xxxxxxxx' AS password \ 
           FROM Wireless_MAC \ 
                                   WHERE mac = %0 \ 
                                   AND (expdate IS NULL OR GETDATE() < 
expdate)\ 
                                   AND (username = '*' OR EXISTS \ 
                                        (SELECT email \ 
                                         FROM STAFF \ 
                                         WHERE email = username)) 
      NoDefault 
                </AuthBy> 
  </AuthBy> 
        AcctLogFileName %L/detail 
</Handler> 
 
# 
# if it isn't a MAC address, don't grant access. 
# 
<Handler Realm = ecs.soton.ac.uk> 
  <AuthBy INTERNAL> 
    DefaultResult REJECT 
  </AuthBy> 
</Handler> 
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11 Appendix C: Offsite proxy RADIUS servers 
 
# 
# this file lists all the offsite proxy RADIUS servers. 
# 
# jjh, 17th july 2003 
# 
 
# 
# uk-tlr.showcase.surfnet.nl, the UK top level RADIUS server. 
# 
<Client 192.87.116.46> 
        Secret xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
       Identifier UK-TLR-PROXY 
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12 Appendix D: List of site access points 
 
# 
# This lists all the APs in ECS. 
# 
 
<Client wlan-b59-4215-ap1.ecs.soton.ac.uk> 
        Secret xxxxxxxx 
        DefaultRealm ecs.soton.ac.uk 
</Client> 
 
<Client wlan-b59-1245-ap1.ecs.soton.ac.uk> 
        Secret xxxxxxxx 
        DefaultRealm ecs.soton.ac.uk 
</Client> 
 
<Client wlan-b59-4237-ap1.ecs.soton.ac.uk> 
        Secret xxxxxxxx 
        DefaultRealm ecs.soton.ac.uk 
</Client> 
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13 Appendix E: Cisco 1200 series AP configuration 
 
! 
! Last configuration change at 10:38:46 UTC Fri Aug 8 2003 
! NVRAM config last updated at 10:38:46 UTC Fri Aug 8 2003 
! 
version 12.2 
no service pad 
service timestamps debug uptime 
service timestamps log datetime msec localtime show-timezone 
service password-encryption 
! 
hostname b59-4203-cisco 
! 
aaa new-model 
! 
! 
aaa group server radius rad_eap 
 server 152.78.68.151 auth-port 1645 acct-port 1646 
 server 152.78.190.1 auth-port 1645 acct-port 1646 
! 
aaa group server radius rad_mac 
 server 152.78.190.1 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813 
 server 152.78.68.151 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813 
! 
aaa group server radius rad_acct 
 server 152.78.190.1 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813 
 server 152.78.68.151 auth-port 1645 acct-port 1646 
 server 152.78.190.1 auth-port 1645 acct-port 1646 
 server 152.78.68.151 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813 
! 
aaa group server radius rad_admin 
! 
aaa group server tacacs+ tac_admin 
! 
aaa group server radius rad_pmip 
! 
aaa authentication login eap_methods group rad_eap 
aaa authentication login mac_methods group rad_mac 
aaa authorization ipmobile default group rad_pmip  
aaa accounting network acct_methods start-stop group rad_acct 
aaa session-id common 
enable password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxx 
! 
username admin privilege 15 password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
ip subnet-zero 
ip domain name ecs.soton.ac.uk 
ip name-server 152.78.68.1 
ip name-server 152.78.70.1 
! 
! 
bridge irb 
! 
! 
interface Dot11Radio0 
 no ip address 
 no ip route-cache 
 ! 
 encryption key 1 size 40bit 7 4B5B4E630D8E transmit-key 
 encryption mode wep optional  
 ! 
 encryption vlan 34 key 1 size 40bit 7 0A266B5C175B transmit-key 
 encryption vlan 34 mode ciphers wep40  
 ! 
 broadcast-key change 1800 
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 ! 
 ssid ECS-EAP 
    vlan 34 
    authentication open mac-address mac_methods eap eap_methods 
    accounting acct_methods 
 ! 
 ssid ECS-WLAN 
    vlan 29 
    authentication open mac-address mac_methods  
    accounting acct_methods 
    guest-mode 
 ! 
 speed basic-1.0 basic-2.0 basic-5.5 basic-11.0 
 rts threshold 2312 
 channel 2412 
 station-role root 
 no cdp enable 
 dot1x reauth-period 1800 
 dot1x client-timeout 120 
! 
interface Dot11Radio0.29 
 encapsulation dot1Q 29 
 no ip route-cache 
 no cdp enable 
 bridge-group 29 
 bridge-group 29 subscriber-loop-control 
 bridge-group 29 block-unknown-source 
 no bridge-group 29 source-learning 
 no bridge-group 29 unicast-flooding 
 bridge-group 29 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface Dot11Radio0.34 
 encapsulation dot1Q 34 native 
 no ip route-cache 
 no cdp enable 
 bridge-group 1 
 bridge-group 1 subscriber-loop-control 
 bridge-group 1 block-unknown-source 
 no bridge-group 1 source-learning 
 no bridge-group 1 unicast-flooding 
 bridge-group 1 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface FastEthernet0 
 no ip address 
 no ip route-cache 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 ntp broadcast client 
 no cdp enable 
 bridge-group 2 
 no bridge-group 2 source-learning 
 bridge-group 2 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface FastEthernet0.29 
 encapsulation dot1Q 29 
 no ip route-cache 
 no cdp enable 
 bridge-group 29 
 no bridge-group 29 source-learning 
 bridge-group 29 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface FastEthernet0.34 
 encapsulation dot1Q 34 
 no ip route-cache 
 no cdp enable 
 bridge-group 1 
 no bridge-group 1 source-learning 
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! 
interface BVI1 
 ip address dhcp client-id FastEthernet0 
 no ip route-cache 
! 
ip http server 
ip http help-path 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/779/smbiz/prodconfig/help/eag/ivory/1100 
ip radius source-interface BVI1 
logging 152.78.190.1 
no cdp run 
radius-server host 152.78.190.1 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813 key 7 
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz 
radius-server host 152.78.68.151 auth-port 1645 acct-port 1646 key 7 
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz 
radius-server host 152.78.190.1 auth-port 1645 acct-port 1646 key 7 
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz 
radius-server host 152.78.68.151 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813 key 7 
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz 
radius-server retransmit 3 
radius-server attribute 32 include-in-access-req format %h 
radius-server authorization permit missing Service-Type 
radius-server vsa send accounting 
bridge 1 route ip 
! 
! 
line con 0 
line vty 5 15 
! 
ntp clock-period 2860629 
ntp server 152.78.71.3 
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14 Appendix F: RADIUS accounting for MAC-based user 
 
 
Mon Feb 23 14:58:48 2004 
        Acct-Session-Id = "00004E20" 
        cisco-avpair = "ssid=ECS-WLAN" 
        cisco-avpair = "nas-location=unspecified" 
        cisco-avpair = "vlan-id=29" 
        cisco-avpair = "auth-algo-type=mac-address" 
        cisco-avpair = "connect-progress=Call Up" 
        Acct-Session-Time = 102 
        Acct-Input-Octets = 1780 
        Acct-Output-Octets = 1504 
        Acct-Input-Packets = 28 
        Acct-Output-Packets = 15 
        Acct-Terminate-Cause = Lost-Carrier 
        cisco-avpair = "disc-cause-ext=No Reason" 
        Acct-Authentic = RADIUS 
        User-Name = "xxxxxxxxxxxx" 
        Acct-Status-Type = Stop 
        NAS-Port-Type = Virtual 
        Cisco-NAS-Port = "363" 
        NAS-Port = 363 
        cisco-avpair = "interface=363" 
        Service-Type = Framed-User 
        NAS-IP-Address = 152.78.190.40 
        Acct-Delay-Time = 0 
        Timestamp = 1077548328 
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15 Appendix G: RADIUS accounting for 802.1x-based user 
 
 
Wed Nov 26 15:42:50 2003 
        Acct-Session-Id = "0000132D" 
        cisco-avpair = "ssid=ECS-EAP" 
        cisco-avpair = "nas-location=unspecified" 
        cisco-avpair = "vlan-id=34" 
        cisco-avpair = "auth-algo-type=eap-peap" 
        cisco-avpair = "connect-progress=Auth Open" 
        Acct-Session-Time = 178705 
        Acct-Input-Octets = 1232148 
        Acct-Output-Octets = 2272689 
        Acct-Input-Packets = 7701 
        Acct-Output-Packets = 10311 
        Acct-Terminate-Cause = Lost-Carrier 
        cisco-avpair = "disc-cause-ext=No Reason" 
        Acct-Authentic = RADIUS 
        User-Name = "xxx@ecs.soton.ac.uk" 
        Acct-Status-Type = Stop 
        NAS-Port-Type = Virtual 
        Cisco-NAS-Port = "506" 
        NAS-Port = 506 
        cisco-avpair = "interface=506" 
        Service-Type = Framed-User 
        NAS-IP-Address = 152.78.190.27 
        Acct-Delay-Time = 20 
        Timestamp = 1069861350 